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 Part of the Legal Ethics and Professional Responsibility Commons 
in cases of indebtedness owed the United States. Services
under such contracts may'extend to collection of claims
through litigation. The Attorney General is directed to
make his best efforts to enter into contracts with firms
owned or controlled by socially and economically disadvan-
,CN taged individuals, to allow agencies to meet their statutory
goal of referring ten percent of all amounts of claims sub-
mitted to private counsel to socially and economically
disadvantaged firms. The amendments also direct the At-
torney General to provide Congress an annual report on
Department of Justice activities to recover debts owed the
United States that were referred to the Department for
collection.
Conclusion
We hope this article will serve as a reference tool to aid
field attorneys in staying current in subjects relating to ac-
quisition law. We expect developments to continue at a
rapid pace throughout 1987. We will continue our efforts to
keep you informed through publication of contract law
notes in the TJAGSA Practice Notes section of The Army
Lawyer as these changes occur.
The Proposed Rules of Professional Conduct: Critical Concerns for Military Lawyers
Captain Donald L. Burnett, Jr., USAR*
Individual Mobilization Augmentee, Gallen Field, Idaho
They started slowly. But state by state, with increasing
momentum, the new Model Rules of Professional Conduct
have begun to displace the Code of Professional Responsi-
bility.' The Department of the Army and the other
uniformed services now must decide which set of standards
will govern military lawyers in the future. This article sum-
marizes the evolution of the new Rules and identifies salient
issues arising from application of the Rules in a military
environment.
Back to the Future: A Glimpse of History
In 1836, Baltimore practitioner David Hoffman pub-
lished "Fifty Resolutions" containing standards of lawyer
behavior. Two decades later, in 1854, George Sharswood,
Dean of the University of Pennsylvania Law School and
eventual Chief Justice of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court,
delivered a series of lectures on legal ethics. These lectures
formed the basis of the Canons of Professional Ethics
adopted by the Alabama State Bar Association in 1887. The
Canons, in turn, were adopted with modifications by the
American Bar Association (ABA) in 1908.
The Canons contained aspirational statements about law-
yers and law practice. By the 1960s, aspirations alone had
proven unsatisfactory as tools to regulate lawyer conduct.
The Canons suffered from excess generality and ambiguity,
causing Professor Anthony Amsterdam to opine that they
provided lawyers with as much useful guidance in their
work as a valentine would furnish a heart surgeon. 2
In 1964, ABA President Lewis F. Powell, Jr., appointed
a special committee to develop standards "capable of en-
forcement." Powell's Committee on Evaluation of
Professional Standards authored the Model Code of Profes-
sional Responsibility. The Code was approved by the ABA
House of Delegates in 1970, and soon was adopted by juris-
dictions throughout the United States. The Department of
the Army adopted the Code by regulation, applying it to all
judge advocates as well as to other lawyers involved in
court-martial proceedings. 4 To make the standards of con-
duct more readily enforceable, the Code coupled "Ethical
Considerations" (ECs) with "Disciplinary Rules" (DRs).
The DRs provided grounds to impose sanctions for profes-
sional misconduct. The ECs, retaining the flavor of the
former Canons, were described in the Code as "aspirational
in character, represent[ing] the objectives toward which ev-
ery member of the profession should strive."
The Code had been in existence less than a decade when
a movement began to modify or to abolish it. The Code's
schizoid presentation of DRs and ECs created confusion as
to what was enforceible and what was not. Some states ar-
guably distorted the Code by adopting the DRs without the
ECs. Moreover, neither the DRs nor the ECs covered many
practical questions encountered in the practice of law.
These questions were addressed by "ethics opinions" of the
ABA and of the adopting jurisdictions. The opinions varied
considerably in content, quality, and accessibility.
* Captain Burnett is a judge on the Idaho Court of Appeals and past president of the Idaho State Bar. He chaired the Idaho Professional Conduct Standards
Committees which evaluated the Model Rules of Professional Conduct prior to their adoption in Idaho.
' During 1983 and 1984, only two states substantially adopted the Model Rules. From January, 1985, through December, 1986, however, several more states
followed suit and the bar associations of other additional states recommended similar action. The jurisdictions where the new Rules now stand approved
entirely or in principle, by court rule or legislation, are New Jersey, Arizona, Delaware, Montana, Minnesota, Missouri, Washington, Arkansas, Nevada,
New Hampshire, North Carolina, Maryland, New Mexico, Connecticut, Florida, and Idaho.
2 Time Magazine, May 13, 1966, at 81, cited in Schneyer, The Model Rules and Problems of Code Interpretation and Enforcement, 1980 Am. B. F. Res. J.
, 939, 939 (1980).
3Armstrong, A Century of Legal Ethics, 64 A.B.A. J. 1063, 1069 (1978).
4 See Dep't of Army, Reg. No. 27-1, Legal Services-Judge Advocate Legal Services para. 5-3 (1 Aug. 1984) ("all JAs and civilian attorneys of the JALS");
Dep't of Army, Reg. No. 27-10, Legal Services--Military Justice, para. 5-8 (1 July 1984). ("military judges, counsel and clerical personnel of Army courts-
martial").
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In 1977, the ABA created another committee, the Com-
mission on Evaluation of Professional Standards. This body
came to be known as the "Kutak Commission,"' in honor of
its chairman, the late Robert J. Kutak, a lawyer from Oma-
ha, Nebraska. During 1980 and 1981, the Kutak
Commission issued a "discussion draft," followed by a
"tentative draft," of proposed new Model Rules of Profes-
sional Conduct. After a spirited-and, in some instances,
acrimonious-response from state and local bars, as well as
from special interest organizations, practitioners, and
professors, the Committee prepared a revised "final draft"
in 1982. The draft was adopted, with further amendments,
by the ABA House of Delegates in 1983.
In 1984, a working group drawn from the various uni-
formed services studied the feasibility of adopting the new
ABA Rules in the military. The group prepared, and for-
warded to The Judge Advocate General of each service, a
proposed set of Rules corresponding to the ABA model,
with modifications deemed appropriate to military needs
and situations. The proposed military Rules now await ac-
tion by the services.
During their evolution, the ABA and military Rules have
come to differ from the existing Code in three fundamental
respects. First, the structure is different. The existing Code
is organized around broad statements of ethical aspirations
carried over from the old Canons of Ethics. The proposed
Rules are organized by specific professional functions and
relationships--e.g., the lawyer-client relationship, the law-
yer as a counselor, the lawyer as an advocate, etc. This
structure now pervades the current literature on profession-
al standards.
The second fundamental difference is substantive., The
proposed Rules explicitly provide, while the existing Code
scarcely recognizes, that lawyers today are not merely rep-
resentatives of their clients. They also are officers of the
legal system and public citizens with special responsibilities
for the fair resolution of disputes and the effective adminis-
tration of justice. The Rules acknowledge that many ethical
problems arise not from dishonesty but from the conflicting
demands placed upon lawyers by these competing roles.
The Rules laudably undertake to resolve such conflicts by
striking balances or assigning priorities among the role re-
quirements. Although the Rules may accomplish this
daunting task imperfectly, they still provide more compre-
hensive and useful guidance than does the Code.
The third difference relates to enforcement. The proposed
Rules define minimum acceptable behavior. They are not
aspirational. As one distinguished commentator has noted:
The Model Rules .. . represent the culmination of a
historical process that began a century and a half ago:
the shift from articulating professional standards, suf-
fused with ideas of morality and ethics, and enforced if
at all by informal sanctions and peer pressure, to en-
acting comprehensive and explicit legislation attended
by formally imposed sanctions for breach. 6
Some might say this is a melancholy comment on the legal
profession. It signifies that lawyers are not unique; they,
like everyone else, need specific rule rather than lofty goals
to guide their behavior. Others would say that the new
Rules are realistic in this regard and may be more effective
in producing ethical conduct than were its aspirational
predecessors.
Whose Rules Apply? Questions and Caveats about
Jurisdiction
The proposed military Rules undertake not only to ad-
dress the competing roles that lawyers play, but also to
prescribe standards broadly applicable to diverse categories
of lawyers who populate the military legal system. "Mili-
tary lawyers" include. judge advocates serving a command;
legal assistance officers engaged in office practice or, where
permitted, representing soldiers in civilian courts; 7 Reserv-
ists performing a variety of tasks on temporary duty;
civilian attorneys who practice law under the disciplinary
control of The Judge Advocate General; and civilian attor-
ney representing soldiers before military tribunals. The
difficulties of balancing and assigning priorities to compet-
ing roles are greatly increased by the heterogeneous
characteristics of the role players. These difficulties are il-
lustrated by the question of disciplinary jurisdiction.
Proposed military Rule 8.5 is disarmingly straightfor-
ward. It simply states; "Lawyers shall be governed by these
Rules of Professional Conduct." On the surface, this lan-
guage does not seem to conflict with the ABA's Model Rule
8.5: "A lawyer admitted to practice in this jurisdiction is
subject to the disciplinary authority of this jurisdiction al-
though engaged in practice elsewhere." The comments
appended to the Rules, however, disclose that the underly-
ing policies are profoundly different.
Although the ABA and military comments both recog-
nize the concurrent jurisdiction of disciplinary authorities,
the military comment declares that the military standards
of conduct shall govern. "To the extent that these Rules
conflict with a lawyer's obligations under the licensing ju-
risdiction's ethical standards, these Rules are controlling."'
In contrast, the ABA's comment genuflects toward plural-
ism among the states and toward comity between the states
and the federal government:
If the Rules of Professional Conduct in. . .two juris-
dictions differ, principles of conflict of laws may
apply. , . . [T]he general authority of the states to
regulate the practice of law must be reconciled with
such authority as federal tribunals may have to regu-
late practice before them.
5 See, e.g., C. Wolfram, Modem Legal Ethics (1986); ABA/BNA Lawyers' Manual on Professional Conduct (1984 and supplements) [hereinafter Lawyers'
Manual]. The structure of the Rules also has proven beneficial in a practical sense. In Idaho and Nevada-two states with which the author is personally
familiar-disciplinary bar counsel found the organization of the ABA's new Rules so plainly superior to the Code that they regularly employed the Rules as
a research aid even before the Rules were substantively adopted.
6 Schwartz, The Death and Regeneration of Ethics. 1980 Am. B. Found. Res. J. 953, 953-54 (1980).
7 Criteria governing practice in civilian courts are set forth in Dep't of Army, Reg. No. 27-3, Legal Services-Legal Assistance, paras. 2-5 and 2-6 (1 Mar.
1984).
8 The comments to the Rule advise that state or federal ethical rules will be followed when lawyers are practicing in state or federal civilian courts during
these civilian court proceedings.
20 FEBRUARY 1987 THE ARMY LAWYER * DA PAM 27-50-170
The ABA Rule and its comment invite criticism for beg-
ging the question of how a lawyer should proceed when
faced with inconsistent standards. The ABA's invocation of
"principles of conflict of laws" simply tells the lawyer that
he or she must guess which of the jurisdictional authorities
( , has the most significant relationship to the lawyer and his
or her conduct. 9 The military rule and its comment seem-
ingly avoid such uncertainty by propounding a bright line
requirement: never stray from the military standard.
The sharp clarity of the military approach is intuitively
appealing. A tension may exist, however, between proclaim-
ing, on one hand, that military standards of conduct prevail
over conflicting state standards, but, on the other hand,
making possession of a valid state license a requirement to
become a judge advocate or to represent clients before mili-
tary tribunals. Suppose a lawyer represents a soldier before
a court-martial located in the lawyer's state of licensure.
During the representation, the lawyer performs an act man-
dated by military standards but prohibited by state
standards. The allegedly aggrieved client files a complaint
with the state's disciplinary authority, claiming that a con-
dition of the lawyer's license has been violated. Will the
state investigate? If so, is the security afforded by the clear
language of military Rule 8.5 simply an illusion?
A state might decline to investigate if it is persuaded that
the lawyer's conduct, having been authorized by a federal
regulation, is insulated from state intrusion by the preemp-
tion doctrine. The United States Supreme Court has held,
in Capital Cities Cable, Inc. v. Crisp, "0 that the preemption
doctrine applies to federal regulations as well as to federal
statutes. The doctrine logically cannot apply with greater
force to regulations than to statutes, however, Preemptive
(N force is not ascribed to statutes unless Congress specifically
expresses its intent to displace state law or congress legis-
lates so pervasively in the subject area that its intent to
occupy the entire field is manifest. I1
Can it fairly be said that Congress has evinced an intent
to displace, or an intent that The Judge Advocates General
displace, the states' traditional power to license law-
yers-particularly those who eventually choose to practice
in the military or before military tribunals? Are The Judge
Advocates General acting as though they have been so
charged? The answers to these questions are unclear. In-
deed, the entire issue of federal administrative regulation of
lawyer conduct has sparked widespread controversy. 12
As a practical matter, it is unlikely that a state would
challenge the power of a uniformed service to prescribe and
enforce standards relating solely to representation of
soldiers by service-employed (albeit state-licensed) lawyers
in matters before military tribunals. Neither is a state likely
to concern itself with practice outside the state that com-
plies with rules of the foreign jurisdiction. "3 The state may
resist, however, if the uniformed service seek broadly to dis-
place the state's standards governing all aspects of an
attorney-client relationship in that state between a civilian
attorney and a soldier whom he or she represents before a
military tribunal, or the relationship in that state between a
service-employed lawyer and a soldier whom he or she rep-
resents in a civilian court.
Nevertheless, on a case-by-case basis, the state might be
persuaded to defer to a military standard of conduct for an-
other reason. Applying the "conflict of laws" approach
embodied in the ABA Model Rule, the state might con-
clude that the military had a more significant relationship
with the lawyer and with the conduct in question. The state
could reach this conclusion in light of important policies
underlying the military standards and the desirability of
maximizing the predictability of rules that govern military
lawyers' conduct. Moreover, state disciplinary authorities,
who are typically understaffed and overworked, might be
reluctant to accept the burden of a case colored by the pros-
pect of litigation with a federal agency over a threshold
question of jurisdiction.
If a particularly important state policy were at stake,
however, a lawyer governed by the military rules would
risk an inquiry by state authorities into his or her conduct.
The risk would be analogous to the uncertainty the lawyer
would have faced if the military had written the ABA's
"conflict of laws" approach into Rule 8.5 at the outset.
Consequently, the difference between the ABA and military
Rules on jurisdiction may be more apparent than real.
Matters of Substance: Confidentiality, Conflicts, and
Organizations
If proposed Rule 8.5 were to prove unsuccessful in
preventing states from investigating complaints against mil-
itary lawyers, the differences between state and military
standards of conduct could become critically important. Al-
though such differences exist in many substantive areas, no
topics affect a lawyer's work more fundamentally than con-
fidentiality, conflicts of interest, and the needs of
organizational clients.
Confidentiality
At common law, as well as by statute and court rule,
communications between lawyer and client have been treat-
ed as privileged. 4 From this evidentiary doctrine has
grown a corollary that the lawyer, as the client's representa-
tive, is required to maintain the confidentiality of all
communications, disclosing only what the client expressly
or impliedly authorizes. As an officer of the legal system
and as a public citizen, however, the lawyer arguably has a
separate duty to prevent perjury, fraud, or other harm to
society.
Three broad approaches to the choice of values be-
tween client confidentiality and third-party and other
social interests are discernible. First, confidentiality
9 The "most significant relationship" test is articulated and explained in the Restatement (Second) of the Conflict of Laws (1969).
10467 U.S.C. 691 (1984).
11 Michigan Canners v. Agricultural Board, 467 U.S. 461 (1984); Florida Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul 373 U.S. 132 (1963).
(r \ 12 See generally C. Wolfram, supra note 5, at 143-44.
13 See, e.g.. Maryland State Bar Ass'n Comm. on Ethics, Opinion No. 86-28, reported in Lawyers' Manual, supra note 5, at 1122-23 (1986 Supp.). The
Committee declared that conduct in another jurisdiction by a Maryland-licensed attorney, consistent with standards of that jurisdiction although inconsis-
tent with those of Maryland, raised no ethical issue in Maryland.
14 A typical formulation of the attorney-client privilege is found in 8 J. Wigmore, Evidence § 2292, at 554 (J. McNaughton rev. ed. 1961).
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could be raised from doctrine to overriding principle
such that a lawyer would always be required to protect
a client's interests regardless of impacts on third par-
ties. That -would treat the values of confidentiality and
the adversary system as absolutes and would require
defense of the implied proposition that their social or
other values are uniformly superior to those of compet-
ing interests and proposed resolutions. Second, and
conversely, third-party and other social interests could
be made predominant, so that interests of client confi-
dentiality and loyalty would have to yield uniformly in
instances of client wrongdoing. A third, much more
complex approach would be to develop criteria or cate-
gories that attempt to differentiate instances in which
either client interests or public interests are to be given
preference. To a large extent, the variegated treatment
of disclosure problems in the 1969 Code and the 1983
Model Rules reflects such a sophisticated approach. 1"
What does "variegated treatment"' mean in the real
world? Suppose a client insists on committing perjury, un-
dertakes a fraud, or threatens physical harm to someone
else. What should the lawyer do? As to perjury or fraud,
the existing Code has furnished little help. DR 7-102(A)
states that the lawyer shall not "knowingly use perjured tes-
timony or false evidence." the same DR further states that
a lawyer shall reveal a "perpetrated" fraud (saying nothing
about a contemplated future fraud). Unfortunately, what
little guidance DR 7-102(A) gives, DRs 4-101(B) and (C)
may take away. They provide that a lawyer's right to make
corrective disclosures does not extend to "confidences" of
the client. "Confidences," as opposed to "secrets," are
broadly defined as all communications protected by the
lawyer-client privilege. As to other kinds of harm, DR
4-101(C)(3) states that a lawyer "may" reveal the client's
intent "to commit a crime, and the information necessary
to prevent the crime." This disclosure apparently is not
subject to the "confidences" exception of DR's.4-101(B)
and (C).
The Code has been criticized for ambiguities lurking in
the terms "confidences" and "crimes," and for prohibiting
the use of perjury without taking account of how difficult it
is to ascertain whether proffered testimony is false. To
achieve greater clarity, the new ABA Model Rules abolish
any distinction between "confidences" and other communi-
cations. Broadly speaking, Rule 1.6 protects from
disclosure any information relating to the lawyer's represen-
tation of the client, except as the client may authorize. Rule
3.3 qualifies this sweeping proposition by providing that a
lawyer "shall" refuse to offer evidence he or she "knows" to
be false and that the lawyer "may" refuse to offer evidence
he or she "reasonably believes" to be false. Rule 1.6 con-
tains a further exception. The lawyer "may" reveal
information to prevent the client from committing "a crimi-
nal act that the lawyer believes is likely to result in
imminent death or substantial bodily harm." The Model
Rules contain no exception for fraud or nonphysical harm;
consequently, such-disclosure without the client's consent is
prohibited.
Although the ABA Model Rules may be clearer than the
Code, not everyone has agreed with the clarification. The
provision in Rule 3.3 concerning false evidence has been
criticized on one hand as going too far, and on the other as
not going far enough, in preventing perjury. The United
States Supreme Court may have muted some criticism
about going too far in Nix v. Whiteside. 16 The Court there
held that a criminal defendant's right to effective assistance
of counsel did not oblige the lawyer to 'cooperate in present-
ing perjured testimony. Thus any concern that Rules 1.6
and 3.3 would conflict with a constitutional right in crimi-
nal cases seems to have been alleviated.
The subjects of fraud and other harm have generated
louder debate. In 1980, the Kutak Commission's "discus-
sion draft" would have 'required disclosure to prevent
criminal acts likely to result in death or serious physical
harm,, and would have allowed disclosure to prevent fraud
or other nonphysical harm. In 1981, the "tentative draft"
was watered down to provide that both kinds of disclosure
would be merely allowed. Nevertheless, some national orga-
nizations of general practitioners and trial lawyers were
dissatisfied. They felt that even the 1981 version encroached
too far upon client confidentiality. They urged that disclo-
sures relating to death or serious physical harm merely
should be allowed and that disclosures of fraud and crimi-
nal acts against property or financial interests should be
prohibited. After a close and sharply divided vote, the ABA
House of Delegates ultimately adopted this position. The
language of Model Rule 1.6 reflects the outcome.
Many states have disagreed. Even among jurisdictions
that have adopted the ABA Rules in substance, several
have departed from Rule 1.6 by mandating disclosure of
threatened death or serious physical harm, or by permitting
disclosure of fraud or other kinds of nonphysical harm. 17
Drafters of the proposed military Rules have charted
their.own path away from Model Rule 1.6. The military
version of the rule echoes the 1980 Kutak draft by requiring
disclosure of client information "to the extent the lawyer
reasonably believes necessary to prevent the client from
committing a criminal act that the lawyer believes is likely
to result in ,imminent death or substantial bodily harm."
This mandatory duty also extends to information concern-
ing a "significant and imminent impairment of national
security or to the readiness or capability of a military unit,
vessel, aircraft, or weapon system." Like its ABA counter-
part, military Rile 1.6 contains no authorization,
mandatory or permissive, to reveal a fraud or other kinds of
nonphysical harm. 's
The military and ABA versions of Rules 1.6 undertake to
balance the value of free and protected communication be-
tween lawyer and client against the social cost of
15 C. Wolfram, supra note 5, at 665-66.
16 106 S. Ct. 988 (1986).
17 Summaries of state action on the ABA Rules are contained in the Lawyers' Manual, supra note 5.
Is In both the ABA and the military versions, Rule 3.3 carves out a narrow exception to the general prohibition against disclosing a fraud. Rule 3.3 pro-
vides, in part, that a lawyer "shall not knowingly ... fail to disclose a material fact to a tribunal when disclosure is necessary to avoid assisting a...
fraudulent act by the client." (Emphasis added.) On a related point, Rule 1.2(d) provides that a lawyer "shall not counsel a client to engage, or assist a client,
in conduct that the lawyer knows is. . . fraudulent.
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nondisclosure where harm ultimately occurs. This balanc-
ing approach presents two problems for the military lawyer.
First, the military Rules may strike one balance while state
standards may strike another--or several others. Suppose a
legal assistance officer representing a soldier discovers that
, 'N the client has perpetrated a fraud upon a third party. If the
state's standards follow the existing Code, or if the state has
adopted the ABA Rules with a modification permitting dis-
closure of fraud, then the lawyer could make a disclosure
and take remedial action. But the lawyer could not do so
under the proposed military Rule. As the lawyer attempts
to reconcile this conflict, he or she will find that his or her
conduct is dictated by the least flexible standard. Because
the proposed military Rule is rigid--mandating some dis-
closure, prohibiting others, and leaving nothing to
discretion-it invariably will prevail over any state standard
merely permitting disclosure. Permissive rules are offended
neither by disclosure nor by nondisclosure. They yield to
the force of mandates and prohibitions. Thus, in the exam-
ple, given, the military Rule will prevail and the lawyer will
choose not to disclose the perpetrated fraud.
Although some lawyers may chafe at this result, at least
the problem of choice is clearly resolved. A second, mote
vexing problem may be harbored by the military Rule itself.
When is an act "likely to result in imminent death or sub-
stantial bodily harm"? Just what is a "significant and
imminent impairment of national security or the readiness
or capability of a military unit, vessel, aircraft, or weapon
system"? Differing interpretations of these phrases would
evoke little concern if disclosures were merely permissive.
But under the military Rule, disclosures are either manda-
tory or prohibited. The interpretation controls the outcome.
('N Consequently, military lawyers in the future may find it
necessary to decide whether a soldier's expressed desire to
"get even" with his estranged spouse is a threat to do "sub-
stantial bodily harm." Or a soldier with a highly
specialized, weapons-related military occupational specialty
may tell his lawyer that he will be temporarily absent with-
out leave in order to resolve a personal problem. Does this
information relate to a "significant and imminent impair-
ment of national security or the readiness or capability of a
• . , weapons system"? The comments to the proposed mil-
itary Rule contain no illustrative fact patterns or other
specific guidance to help resolve such questions.
This does not mean that mandatory disclosure was mis-
takenly written into the military version of Rule 1.6.
Required disclosure may represent an appropriate weighing
of the value of confidentiality against the unique risks of
harm found in a military environment. The Rule and its
present comment, however, will subject military lawyers to
determinations after the fact concerning the propriety of
their conduct. That, ironically, is one of the evils that led to
disaffection with the existing Code.
Conflicts and imputed disqualification
Rules prohibiting conflicts of interest arise from two fun-
damental principles in lawyer-client relationships:
confidentiality and loyalty. The Code currently provides, in
DRs 5-101(A) and 5-105(C), that a lawyer shall not accept
K> employment if the exercise of his other professional judg-
ment on behalf of the client is reasonably likely to be
adversely affected by the differing interests of other clients
or by the lawyer's own personal interests-unless the client
consents after full disclosure. The ABA's Model Rule 1.7
strengthens the safeguard against conflicting interests by re-
quiring that the client give consent after full disclosure and
that the lawyer "reasonably" believe the client's interests
will not be adversely affected. The proposed military Rule
is the same. In one important application of the safeguard
against conflicts, however, the ABA and the military di-
verge. That area is imputed disqualification.
Lawyers practicing together are in a poor position to
give the world assurance that one lawyer is not for
many purposes the alter ego of the other. Ties of
friendship and finance and ready access to each other's
files unite their efforts and interests. . . . In recogni-
tion of such realities, common law doctrine and
professional codes have developed rules that impute to
associated lawyers the conflict of interest disabilities of
each other. In general, if a lawyer is disabled by a con-
flict, his or her partners and associates are similarly
disabled. Yet, once under way, an "imputed disqualifi-
cation" rule can gather relentless momentum and be
given senseless applications. Courts accordingly have
been alert to confine the operation of the imputed-dis-
qualification doctrine to situations that are likely to
present substantial risks that the principles of confiden-
tiality and loyalty will be seriously impaired. '9
Notwithstanding this admonition, the ABA's Model
Rule 1.10 flatly provides that "[w]hile lawyers are associat-
ed in a firm, none of them shall knowingly represent a
client when any one of them practicing alone would be pro-
hibited from doing so by [rules relating to general conflict
of interest, prohibited transactions, former clients or func-
tioning as an intermediary]."
This language embodies a judgment that conflicts of interest
cannot be avoided realistically by anything less than a blan-
ket rule of imputed disqualification.
In contrast, proposed military Rule 1.10 states that
"[l]awyers working in the same military law office are not
automatically disqualified from representing a client be-
cause any of them practicing alone would be prohibited
from doing so." The comment accompanying the military
Rule elaborates:
The principle of imputed disqualification is not auto-
matically controlling for judge advocates. The
knowledge, actions, and conflicts of interest of one
lawyer are not to be imputed to another simply be-
cause they operate from the same office. . . Whether
a lawyer is disqualified requires a functional analysis of
the facts in a specific situation. The following consider-
ations are involved: preserving confidentiality,
maintaining independence of judgment, and avoiding
positions adverse to a client. . . . It is recognized that
the circumstances of military service may require rep-
resentation of opposing sides by military lawyers from
the same office. Such representation is permissible so
long as conflicts of interest are avoided and independ-
ent judgment, zealous representation, and protection of
confidences are not compromised.
19C. Wolfram, supra note 5, at 391.
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,The military Rule embodies a pragmatic compromise.
Recognizing that lawyers' services are finite resources, the
Rule eschews the ABA's emphasis upon outward assur-
ances of loyalty and confidentiality in favor of specific
determinations as to whether infringements upon loyalty or
confidentiality actually exist. Because the information nec-
essary to make such determinations ordinarily is available
only to the lawyer, the client has a scant basis to question
the lawyer's decision.
The rationale underlying the military Rule and its com-
ment plainly suits the limited capabilities of many staff
judge advocate (SJA) and legal assistance offices, particular-
ly those at small installations and overseas sites. But it is
less clear that the rationale fits a soldier's relationship with
a Reserve Component lawyer providing extended legal as-
sistance, or with a civilian lawyer representing the soldier
before a military tribunal. The law practices of these attor-
neys are not finite government resources in the same sense
as SJA and legal assistance offices. There may be no prag-
matic need to provide the soldier clients of these lawyers
any less assurance of loyalty and confidentiality than their
civilian clients would receive.
The uncertain status of Reservists and civilian lawyers
under proposed Rule 1.10 could lead to imposition of differ-
ing demands by the military and by the states. In such
event, as we have seen in the foregoing discussion of confi-
dentiality, the lawyer will find his or her conduct dictated
by the least flexible rule. In cases of imputed disqualifica-
tion, however-unlike cases involving disclosure of
confidential information-the states rather than the mili-
tary are likely to possess the dominant standard. The Code
and the Model Rule mandate disqualification when an affili-
ated lawyer is impaired by a conflict. The military Rule
neither mandates nor prohibits disqualification; it is not
necessarily offended by a decision in a particular case to
refuse employment by the client. Accordingly, Reservists
and civilian attorneys seeking to satisfy both state and mili-
tary standards may find it expedient to adhere to the
imputed disqualification doctrine as though it had been pre-
served in the military Rule.
The Organizational Client
The paradigm lawyer-'client relationship exists between
two individuals. The face of law practice is changing rapid-
ly, however. A recent survey has indicated that
approximately two-thirds of all lawyers work within organi-
zations of some sort, and perform the bulk of their services
for entities rather than individuals. 20
In a substantial amount of legal practice, "the client"
is not the "person with a problem" traditionally de-
picted in legal literature, but an organization with
indeterminate or 'potentially conflicted interests. So
too, the attorney often is not an independent moral
agent but an'employee with circumscribed responsibili-
ty, organizational loyalty, and 'attenuated client
contact. 21
The existing Code does not contain, in its DRs, a stan-
dard governing the conduct of a lawyer toward an
organizational client. Ethical Consideration 5-18, however,
states that a "lawyer employed or retained by a corporation
or similar entity owes his allegiance to the entity and not to
a . . .person connected with the entity," The ABA's new
Model Rule 1.13 explicitly deals with organizational clients,
reemphasizing the basic precept that the lawyer's client is
the entity itself.
The critical question faced by lawyers representing enti-
ties is what to do if a person in authority within the
organization acts, or intends to act, contrary to the organi-
zation's legal interests. Model Rule 1.13 provides no
discrete answer. It offers guidelines, some of which narrow
the lawyer's ethical responsibility. The lawyer need be con-
cerned with the aberrant individual's conduct only if it
relates to the subject matter of the lawyer's representation
of the entity. Moreover, the lawyer must determine whether
the individual's conduct is "a violation of a legal obligation
to the organization, or a violation of law which reasonably
might to imputed to the organization, and is likely to result
in substantial injury to the organization."22
If these tests are satisfied, then the lawyer must "proceed
as is reasonably necessary in the best interest of the organi-
zation." The remedial measures a lawyer may undertake
include requesting the individual to reconsider his or her
conduct; advising the individual to seek another legal opin-
ion; referring the matter to "higher authority" in the
organization; and, as a last resort, terminating the lawyer-
client relationship with the organization. Prominently omit-
ted from the laundry list of permissible remedies' is
"whistle-blowing"-disclosure of information to outside
parties in order to prevent the individual from harming the
organization. 'Authority to blow the whistle was contained
in the Kutak Committee's 1980, 1981 and 1982 drafts, but
it was excised, and the lawyer's option to resign was insert-
ed, by the ABA's House of Delegates.
The proposed military version of Rule 1.13 also discour-
ages "whistle-blowing" by impliedly prohibiting disclosures
to persons outside the uniformed service unless authorized
by Rule 1.6. The military Rule retains many of the ABA's
guidelines narrowing the circumstances in which the lawyer
must be concerned with individual misconduct, and it lists
the remedial measures available. Among these measures is
the option to refer the matter to higher authorities in the
Army. Military lawyers are encouraged to voice their con-
cerns through supervisory judge advocate channels rather
than directly employing the non-legal chain ofcommand to
resolve the perceived problem. The proposed military rule
also expressly recognizes the lawyer's alternative of termi-
nating the representation. The military rule is essentially
coextensive with the ABA version.
Rule 1.13 represents a fragile consensus-on minimum
standards in a rapidly evolving area of professional respon-
sibility. If the Rule seems more precatory than prescriptive,
it illustrates the difficulty of distilling specific standards of
conduct from general principles. As the early Canons, the
present Code, and the new Rules show, this is the never-
ending but ennobling task of a profession that takes ethics
seriously and tries to bring its behavior closer to its
aspirations.
20 B. Curran, The Legal Professiohs of the 1980s: Selected Statistics From the 1984 Lawyer Statistical Report (1984).
21 Rhode, Ethical Perspectives on Legal Practice, 37 Stan. L. Rev. 589, 590 (1985).
22 Model Rules of Professional Conduct Rule 1.13 (Discussion Draft 1983) (emphasis added).
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